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KOONS' COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
GrahamOppy 
Robert Koons has recently defended what he claims is a successful argument 
for the existence of a necessary first cause, and which he develops by taking "a 
new look" at traditional arguments from contingency. I argue that Koons' 
argument is less than successful; in particular, I claim that his attempt to "shift 
the burden of proof" to non-theists amounts to nothing more than an ill-dis-
guised begging of one of the central questions upon which theists and 
non-theists disagree. I also argue that his interesting attempt to bridge (part of) 
the familiar gap between the claim that there is a necessary first cause and the 
claim that God exists is beset with numerous difficulties. 
In "A New Look at the Cosmological Argument,"l Robert Koons claims to 
present "a successful defeasible argument for the existence of a necessary First 
Cause." (p. 193) My aim is to subject this assessment of his achievement to 
critical scrutiny. After sketching his argument, I shall present some reasons 
for thinking that Koons' cosmological argument is less successful than he 
supposes-and I shall also indicate reasons for thinking that various aspects 
of his discussion are far more controversial than he seems to suppose. 
1 
Without too much injustice, we may represent the argument which Koons 
proposes to defend as follows: 
1. There are contingent events. (Premise) 
2. If there are contingent events, then there is an event which is the 
sum of all contingent events. (Premise, justified by the general 
claim that, for any f, if there are f-€vents, then there is an event 
which is the sum of all f -€vents.) 
3. (Hence) there is an event C which is the sum of all contingent 
events. (From 1, 2) 
4. C is a wholly contingent event. (Premise; proved in~dependently by 
Koons from assumptions which will not here be questioned) 
5. Every wholly contingent event has a cause. (Premise) 
6. (Hence) C has a cause. (From 4,5) 
7. Causes and effects must not overlap. (Premise) 
8. (Hence) C has a cause which is a necessary event. (From 6, 7, defin-
ition of "wholly contingent".) 
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Since this looks a little different from the (rather longer) proof which Koons 
presents, I need to add some further comments. 
First, Koons actually casts his proof in terms of "facts" rather than 
"events". Since he claims that it is a matter of indifference whether one talks 
about "facts" or "events" or "states of affairs" (p. 196), the change which I 
have made doesn't matter to him. However, it does matter to me: I reckon 
that events obey mereological principles, but facts and states of affairs do 
not. (One of the commonest complaints that one hears about the inclusion 
of facts and states of affairs in one's ontology is that these are entities which 
obey some weird, non-mereological kind of composition.) Since Koons 
argument requires mereological principles, I insist that it be framed in terms 
of events. (Another reason for this insistence is that it is events-not facts, or 
states of affairs, or propositions-which stand in causal relations. Here 
again, Koons is indifferent to the choice of terminology, so he can hardly 
object to my insistence on "events".) 
Second, Koons insists that Premise 5 ought to be accepted as a default or 
defeasible rule. "This means that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
we may infer, about any particular wholly contingent fact, that it has a 
cause. This is, however, all that is needed for the cosmological argument to 
be rationally compelling. The burden will be shifted to the agnostic, who 
must gamer evidence of a positive sort for the proposition that the cosmos 
really is an exception to the rule. Merely pointing out the defeasible nature 
of the inference does not constitute a cogent rebuttal." (pp. 196-7) I shall 
have more to say about this later. 
Third, Koons provides a detailed defence of Premise 4 from further mereo-
logical and modal premises which I do not wish to investigate here. Koons 
himself claims that there is no great originality in his argument, beyond the 
use of three resources- mereology, modem modal logic and non-monotonic 
logic-which were not available to the classical authors. (p. 195) I think that 
there is plenty to say against his claim that his argument is "rationally com-
pelling" without worrying about the detailed use which he makes of mereolo-
gy and modal logic-hence my decision to forgo discussion of Premise 4. 
However, I shall have more to say about his use of non-monotonic logic. 
2 
Koons motivates his "new look" at arguments from contingency by appeal 
to the "dated" appearance of three objections which Russell raises in his 
debate with Copleston, viz.: 
(a) There is no intelligible form of necessity other than logical truth. 
(b) There is no reason to suppose that any such thing as "the uni-
verse" exists. 
(c) Even if there is such a thing as "the universe", our empirical 
knowledge gives us no good reason to assume that it has a cause. 
The clear implication of this appeal is that these are the best objections 
which have been raised against arguments from contingency in the past 
fifty years; that these are the considerations to whicl1 opponents of argu-
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ments from contingency continue to advert when objecting to those argu-
ments; and that these considerations are plainly inadequate to refute argu-
ments from contingency. 
While (a) and (b) still have their supporters/ I am happy to follow Koons 
in rejecting them-or, at any rate, in allowing that they do not constitute 
powerful objections to arguments from contingency. Moreover, I am confi-
dent that few non-theists in recent times have rested their rejection of argu-
ments from contingency on these grounds.3 However, the status of (c) is 
clearly quite different: I believe it, and I suspect that almost all non-theists 
agree with me in this respect. 
One characteristic of cosmological arguments is possession of a premise 
of the form "Every C has a K," where "C" is "contingent event", or "wholly 
contingent event", or "spatio-temporal event", or the like, and where "K" is 
"cause", or "sufficient reason", or "complete explanation", and so on! It is 
these kinds of premises which Koons claims are default or defeasible rules. 
It is also these kinds of premises which non-theists typically and most vehe-
mently dispute: it just isn't so that the universe has a cause, or a complete 
explanation, or a sufficient reason-so, of course, the universal generalisa-
tions in question cannot be true! 
This is not to say that non-theists need to deny that these kinds of 
premises are default or defeasible rules, in something like the sense which 
Koons intends. At p. 196, he writes: "[A]t the very least, our experience war-
rants adopting the causal principle as a default or defeasible rule. This 
means that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we may infer, about 
any particular wholly contingent fact, that it has a cause." Fair enough: in 
the absence of reason to think otherwise, one should think that a particular 
wholly contingent event has a cause. (Not "in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary:" that fails to respect that fact that theoretical considerations-or 
admixtures of theoretical and evidential considerations--could be defeaters 
of the rule.) But, at least by the lights of most non-theists, there are good 
reasons for thinking otherwise in certain cases, including the case of the uni-
verse as a whole. 
Of course, some opponents of arguments from contingency claim that 
these causal premises should be viewed as heuristics (canons or prescriptive 
rules for reason), and not as descriptions of mind-independent reality. 
Against them, Koons has two objections: first: "it is hard to see why the 
abundant success of empirical science .. does not provide overwhelming 
empirical support for the generalisation to all contingent facts;" (p. 197) and 
second: "the price of denying this axiom is very steep: embracing a compre-
hensive Pyrrhonian scepticism." (p. 197) I think that it is obvious that one 
can agree with Koons that the correct causal premises should be viewed as 
descriptions of mind-independent reality, for more or less the reasons that 
he gives, while nonetheless rejecting the forms of the premises which are 
required for arguments from contingency. 
Here's how. Say that spatiotemporal events are "first events" iff there are 
no spatiotemporal events which are temporally prior to them. So, for exam-
ple, all initial "histories" of the universe-even ones which extend right up 
to the present-are first events. The principle which we want is that, in the 
absence of reason to think otherwise, we should think that particular, whol-
KOONS' COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 381 
ly contingent events which are not first events have causes. Plainly, all of 
the evidence which supports Koons' favored version of the causal principle 
supports this version of the principle equally well. Equally plainly, this ver-
sion of the principle offers no comfort at all to Pyrrhonian scepticism. 
Perhaps Koons might complain that the collection of events which are not 
first events is "an unnatural and gerrymandered kind"-but I see no reason 
at all to agree with him. Because the universe has no cause, first events 
require special treatment when it comes to framing certain causal princi-
ples-the natural collection of events for framing certain causal principles is 
just the collection of events which are not first events.s 
In sum, then, I think that it is perfectly clear that Koons' argument is not 
"rationally compelling". Against Koons' claim that the burden of proof has 
been shifted to the non-theist-"who must gamer evidence of a positive 
sort for the proposition that the cosmos really is an exception to the rule"-I 
suggest that all we have is a gross begging of the question.6 How "the rule" 
is formulated depends upon the view which one takes of theism: by the 
lights of non-theists, "the rule" is best formulated in such a way that the cos-
mos does not even fall in its domain. 
(One final observation. I have claimed that non-theists have good rea-
sons for supposing that the universe does not have a cause, or a sufficient 
reason, or a complete explanation, or .... I do not mean to be taken to be say-
ing that there are reasons which should lead theists to give up their theistic 
beliefs.7 There are many, many factors which can be taken into account in 
judging whether or not God exists, and these factors can be reasonably 
weighed in different ways by different reasonable people. Moreover, there 
are typical packages of beliefs which go along with the claim that God exists 
(and the claim that God does not exist)-and the same point about different 
reasonable weightings can be made with respect to these packages as well. 
Since Koons knows perfectly well that non-theists will prefer the kinds of 
causal principles which I have sketched to the kinds which feature in his 
argument, it is hard to resist the conclusion that his "new look" at argu-
ments from contingency amounts to nothing more than the argumentative 
equivalent of stamping your foot. Non-theists have heard all this before-
and there is no reason why they should be any more impressed this time 
around.B) 
3 
Even if one were persuaded by Koons' argument for the existence of a First 
Cause, one might still think that he hasn't come at all close to proving the 
existence of anything like the familiar God of the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
Koons recognises this point, and provides a series of seven "corollaries" to 
his proof which are intended to establish that the First Cause has at least 
some of the attributes which are traditionally attributed to God. However, 
the argumentation in these "corollaries" is quite sloppy, and does not suffice 
to quieten the familiar suspicion that there is no decent argument from First 
Cause to God. 
Koons' first corollary is that the First Cause includes the existence of a 
necessary being. In order to establish this, he assumes that "every fact 
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includes at least one being and at least one property of that being," (p. 199) 
and goes on to infer that "a necessary fact entails the necessary existence of 
some being." I would like to know more about the "inclusion" relation 
which holds between objects and facts--I assume that it is not mereological, 
but beyond that I am rather in the dark. More importantly, the inference 
here seems to me to be invalid. From the premise that there has to be some-
thing, I cannot validly infer that there is something which has to be.9 Since 
Koons does not tell us about the truth--makers for modal claims, it may be 
just that part of the story remains to be told-but, at the very least, there is 
reason to be cautious about accepting the first corollary. 
Koons' second corollary is that the necessary being included in the cause 
of the cosmos is not a mere aggregate. But there was nothing in the first 
corollary which ruled out the possibility that there might be many neces-
sary beings involved in the cause of the cosmos. (Koons does mention the 
possibility of a "system of beings", but I don't see why there couldn't be a 
quite "unsystematic" collection of necessary beings.) Moreover, I am not 
persuaded by his claim that a composite or aggregate object cannot exist 
necessarily because a constituent part of a mere aggregate can exist in the 
absence of the rest of the aggregate. Suppose you think that numbers and 
sets exist necessarily; it seems perfectly consistent with this view that you 
think that at least some sets of numbers are mere aggregates-and likewise 
for at least some fusions of numbers. Why shouldn't we think that there can 
be fusions of necessarily existing objects which, while being merely 
aggregative, are nonetheless necessarily existent? 
Koons' third corollary is that God has all of its basic attributes by necessi-
ty. Koons' characterisation of "basic attributes" is brief and not terribly clear; 
but, even if we suppose that we know what he means, it seems to me that 
his argument in support of the third corollary is quite unpersuasive. What 
he says is that God's basic attributes are all included in the First Cause. But 
there is something quite mysterious about this claim. Ordinarily, if an entity 
is part of an event-say the event involves the entity undergoing some 
change--we don't have any inclination to say that the properties of the enti-
ty are included in the event. When I eat a piece of toast which was pur-
chased at Safeways, we don't have any inclination to say that the property 
of being purchased at Safeways is included in the event of my eating the 
toast. Indeed, I don't think I understand the claim that the basic properties 
of God are included in the First Cause,: so I don't see how it can help us to 
get to the conclusion that God has all of its basic attributes by necessity. 
Koons' fourth corollary is that all of the parts of God have all of their 
attributes by necessity. He claims that, if God has a part, then any attribute 
of that part corresponds to an attribute of God; whence, by the third corol-
lary, we get the desired conclusion. However, even if we waive our objec-
tions to the third corollary, it isn't clear why we should grant the further 
assumption which he needs. We know that it isn't always true that the 
properties of parts of things are properties of those things-there are parts 
of my car which weigh less than one kilogram, but my car does not weigh 
less than one kilogram-so what does Koons mean when he says that 
attributes of the parts of God correspond to attributes of God? (Let's say, 
just for the sake of argument, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost 
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are all proper parts of God. Should we say that God is a proper part of God 
just because the Son is?''') 
Koons' fifth corollary is that God has only immeasureable attributes. In 
order to argue for this conclusion, he claims (1) that all measureable quanti-
ties are continuous; and (2) that for any measureable attribute A which con-
sists in having determinable 0 to degree m, and any being x that has A, 
there is some degree e such that it is possible for x to have 0 to degree m-e 
or m+e. Against (I), it seems to me that it is plainly neither necessary nor a 
priori that all measureable quantities are continuous. Indeed, it seems that 
quantum mechanics tells us that there are actually instantiated attributes 
which can only come in quanta. Moreover, it is not uncommon to encOlmter 
speculations to the effect that the world is fundamentally discrete, so that all 
measure able quantities are actually discrete. Against (2)-which Koons 
takes to be supported by (I)-it seems to me lmclear why one should sup-
pose that possession of a measureable quantity to a particular, perfectly pre-
cise degree could not be part of the essence of a thing. A mathematical point 
is essentially of measure zero; likewise for a point particle. Couldn't it be the 
case that there are particles which are essentially point particles? 
Even if we waive these objections to (1) and (2), it still seems very doubt-
ful that Koons' argument for the fifth corollary is any good. From the claim 
that no measureable attribute can be had by necessity, Koons concludes that 
if God has a size, it must be infinitely large; that if God has an age, it must 
be infinitely old; and that if God has power or intelligence, then God must 
be infinitely powerful and infinitely intelligent. However, it seems to me 
that this can't be right. Since size, age, power, and intelligence "all partici-
pate in the structure of more or less," surely the right conclusion to draw is 
tlk,t these properties cannot be applied to God. Perhaps Koons might reply 
that to be infinitely old is not to have an age, that to be infinitely intelligent 
is not to have an intelligence, and so on. But, if these claims were plausible, 
we would be completely in the dark as to the nature of the properties which 
God is supposed to have. (What on earth could infinite age be if is not a 
limit on the scale of age?) And these claims are not plausible: to be infinitely 
old is to be older than any thing whose age is finite; to be infinitely large is 
to be larger than any thing whose size is finite; and so on. (Perhaps it is also 
worth noting that it is often possible to define mathematical transformations 
which take infinite values to finite values, and vice versa. So, if there are 
scales on which measures of certain properties are infinite, there will be 
other scales on which measures of those properties are finite. Think for 
example, of proper time versus York time or Milne time-a being can be 
infinitely old according to Milne time and yet only finitely old according to 
proper time.) 
Even if we waive the objections of the preceding paragraph, Koons' dis-
cussion of the fifth corollary is not without difficulty. Koons claims that, if it 
makes sense to attribute a property to God, then that property must be infi-
nite. Now, it makes sense to suppose that God is ugly, evil, and stupid-
and so, since Koons won't let us say that God possesses these properties to 
degree zero, we are forced into the absurd (and indeed contradictory) posi-
tion of holding that God is infinitely ugly, infinitely evil and infinitely stu-
pid. Not good. (Quite generally, if a property is possessed to an infinite 
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degree, then the complement of that property should be possessed to 
degree zero. But that means that there has to be something wrong with 
Koons' discussion. Or, at any rate, we need some further account of the 
nature of "basic attributes" which makes it clear that this objection can be 
avoided. ll ) 
Koons' sixth corollary is that God is not essentially located in space and 
time; and his seventh corollary is that God is not essentially a physical 
object, nor is it essentially constituted by physical objects. His arguments for 
these corollaries depend upon the earlier corollaries which we have already 
discussed. The upshot of this discussion is that Koons' has not managed sat-
isfactorily to establish any of the corollaries which he announces-and, in 
pretty much all cases, it is hard to see how his arguments might be repaired. 
Of course, even if the arguments for the seven corollaries were successful, 
we should still be a long way short of showing that the First Cause is the 
God of the Judeo-Christian tradition. But it is worth emphasising, I think, 
that it is very hard to fill in the gap left by Aquinas' "that all men call 
God"--even if arguments from contingency were entirely cogent, it is not 
clear that this would be such a tremendous advance for orthodox theology. 
4 
Koons disagrees. In his view, we should think of cosmological arguments as 
parts of more embracing arguments which also draw upon teleological con-
siderations in order to establish the properties of God. If we can show that 
there is reason to attribute intelligence to "the necessary being involved in 
the First Cause," then we shall be further advanced in our project of show-
ing that the First Cause is God. 
I have already argued that Koons has not managed to show either that 
there is a First Cause, or that there is a unique necessary being involved in 
the First Cause. So I do not think that his argument from contingency can 
help teleological arguments in the way that he supposes. But what if I'm 
wrong? What if his argument from contingency is cogent, and he can go on 
to establish that there is a unique necessary being involved in the First 
Cause? Should we then think that the best explanation of the data appealed 
to in teleological arguments is that this necessary being is the intelligent 
designer of the world? 
In order to think about this question, it will be useful for us to bear in 
mind two distinct meanings which can be attributed to the word "universe". 
On the one hand, "universe" can mean "the sum of contingent things." On 
the other hand, "universe" can also mean "the sum of things which are spa-
tia-temporally and causally connected to us." These two different uses of 
the word "universe" need not coincide in extension. Moreover, the cosmo-
logical argument is concerned with the "universe" in one of these senses, 
and the teleological argument is concerned with the "universe" in the other 
sense. Koons' cosmological argument is concerned with the sum of contin-
gent things; but his teleological argument is concerned with the sum of 
things which are spatia-temporally and causally connected to us ("physical 
constants and Big Bang conditions" in our spatia-temporal domain). 
The difference between these two senses of "universe" may be important. 
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Suppose-as Koons does-that we live in a Big Bang universe. Could there 
be times and contingent events back before the Big Bang-Le. times and 
contingent events which are not parts of our universe? Many people have 
thought not; many people have thought that it is simply meaningless to 
suppose that there might be times (and contingent events) back then. But-
as John Earman points out- this isn't right: 
By itself, a model of the Big Bang .. is neither compatible nor incom-
patible with the notion that there are instants of time before the initial 
singularity. The fate of that notion depends on our choice of 
extendibility conditions .... It remains open that there is some mathe-
matically meaningful extension .. and that ... other metaphysical caus-
es operate in this mathematical time. 12 
In other words: for all that our best physical theories tell us, it could be that 
the chain of contingent events extends back far beyond the Big Bang. And 
in that case it seems that it must remain an open possibility that the First 
Cause is not the source of the apparent evidence of design which is found in 
our universe-it could be that there is some other free and contingent being 
which is responsible for the apparent evidence of design in our universe. (I 
say seems because it could be that Koons will insist that the First Cause gets 
the credit for anything which its free and contingent creatures do. Since this 
isn't orthodox theism, I assume that Koons won't go this way.) 
Once one grants this possibility, Humean speculations obtain their usual 
purchase. There are ever so many hypotheses which one might frame about 
possible designers-and so little in the way of evidence to choose between 
them! Committees, warring factions, botchers and bodgers-lots of 
hypotheses which might better account for some of the features of the 
world than does the hypothesis of the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
Koons might claim that the hypothesis that the First Cause is the Intelligent 
Designer is simpler, and ought to be accepted on these grounds. But, as I 
have just observed, I do not see that it is at all obvious that this hypothesis is 
the best explanation of the data. At the very least-given the nature of the 
hypotheses under consideration-one is asking this appeal to simplicity to 
do an awful lot of work. Is it really plausible to suggest that it is not rational 
to fail to accept the hypothesis that the First Cause is the Intelligent 
Designer in the circumstances which we have been envisaging? 
There are other responses which one might make to Koons' teleologi-
cal-cum-cosmological argument. Even if one accepts that there is a First 
Cause-a necessary event which stands at the beginning of the causal net-
work to which all contingent events belong-it seems to me that one could 
perfectly well suppose that there is no Intelligent Designer. For example, 
one might suppose that our necessary event is bound to "throw out" all pos-
sible universes-and amongst the possible universes, there are bound to be 
some in which there is life. (Could there be a proof of modal realism which 
runs along something like the lines of Koons' argument from contingency?) 
In closing, perhaps I should emphasise again that it doesn't matter too 
much if the last few paragraphs of argumentation are mistaken-since there 
is no doubt that the argument from contingency is no good, there is no way 
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that it can be used to prop up teleological arguments. 
5 
In the last part of his paper, Koons considers thirteen objections to the argu-
ments which he defends. I shall only consider the last of these objections 
here. (For the most part, I do not wish to disagree with Koons' discussion of 
the first twelve objections. There have been plenty of bad objections laid 
against arguments from contingency. D) This last objection claims that the 
data appealed to in Koons' teleological argument-"cosmic anthropic coin-
cidences"---can be explained (about as well) by appealing to a very large-
possibly infinit~nsemble of universes. 
To this objection, Koons makes two replies. First, he claims that argu-
ments from contingency rule out this response-given that we know that 
there is a First Cause, the only reasonable conclusion to draw from the cos-
mological data is that the First Cause "encompasses the existence of an intel-
ligent designer." To which I say: since the arguments from contingency are 
not cogent, we have been given no reason to think that there is a First 
Cause, and so this reply fails. Suppose, however, that we grant that some 
arguments from contingency succeed. Must we then agree with Koons that 
the cosmological data strongly supports the claim that the world was 
designed by an intelligent being which is somehow "encompassed" by the 
First Cause? I don't think so. For the reasons given in the previous section, it 
seems to me that there is little reason to be confident that the First Cause 
and the Intelligent Designer are one; and there is also some reason to think 
that it could perfectly well be that there is a First Cause and no Intelligent 
Designer. 
Second, Koons claims that "the junky cosmos hypothesis"-i.e. the 
hypothesis that there is an ensemble of worlds, many of which contain no 
life-is "the most flagrant possible violation of Occam's razor and a death 
sentence to all other uses of that principle." (p. 208) He writes: 
This hypothesis postulates an infinity of entities for which there is absolute-
ly no positive evidence, simply in order to avoid the necessity of explaining 
the anthropic coincidences we have observed. This is the height of meta-
physical irresponsibility, far worse than the most extravagant speCUlations 
of medieval angelology ..... Moreover .. if the junky cosmos hypothesis (in 
its full generality) is true, it is demonstrable that the simplest hypothesis of 
astronomy or biology is no more likely to be true of our universe than the 
most complicated Rube-Goldberg constructions .... It would be arbitrary to 
use the junky cosmos hypothesis to block the inference to the theistic 
hypothesis, while modifying it with the explicit purpose of preserving the 
defensibility of all other well-confirmed hypotheses (pp. 208-9) 
I think that most of this is wrong. To begin with, it isn't at all clear that the 
junky cosmos hypothesis- the hypothesis that there is an ensemble of 
worlds, many of which contain no life-commits one to an infinity of 
worlds. Moreover, it is quite clear that acceptance of this hypothesis can 
proceed according to the normal canons of scientific inference. There is 
some data to be explained. This data would be explained if there were an 
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ensemble of worlds of the right kind. There is no better explanation to be 
had. So there is good reason to think that there is an ensemble of worlds. 
Contra Koons, there is positive evidence for the proposal (the data to be 
explained), there is no avoidance of explanation of anthropic coincidences 
(on the contrary, the existence of the ensemble of worlds explains those 
coincidences), and there is no metaphysical irresponsibility (provided that it 
is true that there is no better explanation to be had). Since we are just fol-
lowing the normal canons of scientific explanation, there is no justification 
for the claim that postulation of an ensemble of worlds is arbitrary, or that it 
sounds the death knell for scientific explanation. 
Of course, Koons will not agree that there is no better explanation to be 
had. However, the crucial question is whether non-theists cannot reason-
ably believe that there is no better explanation to be had. I don't see why 
this could not be the case. After all, it seems to be clearly a matter for judge-
ment whether one thinks that postulation of an ensemble of worlds is 
preferable to postulation of (say) the familiar God of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition. (Once one reflects on the problem of evil, the problem of reconcil-
ing human freedom with divine foreknowledge, the doctrines of the Trinity 
and the Incarnation, angelology, and so on, one might well reasonably think 
that the postulation of an ensemble of worlds is cheap at half the price. Or, 
at any rate, so non-theists might reasonably suppose.) 
This is not to say that non-theists must suppose that there is an ensemble 
of worlds. One might think, for example, that there has to be a better expla-
nation of the anthropic coincidences than either theism or postulation of an 
ensemble of worlds provides-and then confess that one does not know 
what form that explanation might take. Provided that one thinks that the-
ism and the postulation of an ensemble of worlds are roughly on an 
explanatory par, one who follows this line cannot be charged with any dox-
alogical malpractice. And nor can one who holds that the theistic hypothe-
sis is better than the postulation of an ensemble of worlds, but that its prior 
probability is extremely low-if all one has is a bunch of bad theories, then 
one ought not to infer to any of them. II 
6 
Koons concludes his paper with the claim that "the future progress of sci-
ence, and the successful defense of science against its post-modernist and 
relativist opponents, depends on the severing of the mistaken connection 
between science and the Chance-creation myth [=the claim that there is no 
First Cause]." (210) T doubt it. Almost all of science is independent of the 
view which one takes about the causal status of first events; in all the sci-
ences, there have been important contributions from theists and non-theists 
alike-believers in caused and lmcaused first events alike-and no doubt 
there will continue to be so. Moreover, opposition to science has been-and 
no doubt will continue to be-neither the special preserve of theists nor 
non-theists. And there are plenty of theists amongst the legions of 
"post-modernists and relativists" who are reputed to be milling outside the 
gates of science. 
Unlike Koons, I have no grand concluding claims. I would like to suggest 
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that a fresh look at arguments from contingency will confirm what most 
people have known all along-these arguments are no good, and there is no 
prospect that they might be made better. I would also like to hope that this 
article will help to ensure that we shan't hear a great deal more about them 
in the coming years (though I would not be holding my breath). But, of 
course, nothing that I have said in this paper establishes that arguments 
from contingency could not be resurrected-i.e., I do not suppose that my 
arguments against Koons show that arguments from contingency are no 
good. What these arguments do show, I think, is that Koons' attempt to 
revive arguments from contingency is unsuccessful.15 
Monl1sh University 
NOTES 
1. R. Koons (1997) "A New Look at the Cosmological Argument," American 
Philosophical Quarterly 34, 2, pp. 193-211. All page numbers in the text refer to this 
article. 
2. E.g., for (a), see B. van Fraassen (1977) "The Only Necessity is Verbal 
Necessity," Journal of Philosophy 73, pp. 623-32; and for (b), see B. van Fraassen 
(1995) "World is not a Count Noun," Nous 29, pp. 139-57. Perhaps Koons thinks 
that van Fraassen's version of logical empiricism is "quite dated". 
3. In The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), J. L. 
Mackie claims that we need to be shown that it is possible that there be a neces-
sary being (in the sense which arguments from contingency require). Mackie's 
claim does seem to rest on scepticism about the notion of a "broadly metaphysi-
cally necessary" being, and hence might be taken to involve commitment to (a). 
However, Mackie also insists strongly on (c)-i.e. his rejection of arguments 
from contingency does not rest on (a) alone. 
4. Strictly, some of the quote-marks here are Quinean comer-quotes: those 
who worry about such niceties should make the appropriate substitutions. 
5. Another approach which non-theists might take is to concede that the 
collection of events which are not first events is slightly less natural than the col-
lection of events simpliciter, but hold that, overall, non-theistic theories score best 
on the appropriate weighting of theoretical desiderata: naturalness, simplicity, 
explanatory scope, explanatory power, and so on. 
6. Curiously, there are a couple of places where Koons explicitly notes that 
we do not need to suppose that all events have causes in order to do science and 
avoid Pyrrhonian scepticism. At p.197: "Without the conviction that all (or nearly 
all) of these have causes ... ;" and at p.202: "We know that all (or nearly all) whol-
ly contingent facts have causes .... " Given these parenthetical remarks-and 
given that we can't say that a significant proportion of events are first events-it 
is hard to see what non-question-begging objection he could have to the revised 
rule. 
7. It could be, for example, that these reasons derive from global theoretical 
considerations about the superiority of naturalistic theories; in that case, these 
reasons might have no role to play in dialectical disputes between theists and 
non-theists (because these may just be matters for judgement about which rea-
sonable people can reasonably disagree). 
8. In a footnote, Koons acknowledges his debt to "Norman Geisler, 
Mortimer Adler, William Lane Craig and Stanley Jaki, who are largely responsi-
ble for keeping the tradition of the cosmological argument alive in the latter half 
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of the twentieth century." (211 n 1) This list is seriously incomplete: Barry Miller, 
David Braine, Robert Meyer, Bruce Reichenbach, Brian Davies, and many others 
have provided serious defences of cosmological arguments in recent times. More 
importantly, there is something odd about the idea that ,ill argument which is so 
good should be so poorly regarded. What does Koons suppose that non-theists 
do when they think about this argument? Surely the treatment which it has 
received it fair evidence that it is not a good argument. (That's not to say that it is 
not unfairly or unreasonably dismissed by some. But, given that one is not draw-
ing attention to new evidence or new considerations which have hitherto been 
overlooked, one needs to make some pretty big assumptions about the integrity 
and competence of philosophers at large in order to accow1t for the large-scale 
rejection of the argument.) 
9. Given the Barcan principles, this inference would be justified. Koons 
gives himself the Barcan principles in his modal logic for facts. But he should not 
want to give himself these principles in the case of the modal logic of individu-
als: theists typically do not want to hold that all objects are necessary existents 
(nor that iliere could be no other objects apart from ilie ones which actually 
exist). (The Barcan principle says: if everything is necessarily .... , ilien it is neces-
sary that everyiliing is ..... And the converse Barcan principle says: if it is neces-
sary that everyiliing is .... , ilien everything is necessarily ..... In order to allow 
that both these principles are logical theorems, one needs to insist that one has 
exactly the same objects in each possible world. Cf. G. Hughes and M. Cresswell 
An Introduction to Modal Logic (London: Methuen, 1968), pp.142--4, 170-1. If you 
think iliat existence is a predicate-as orthodox ilieism seems to demand-then 
the mere truth of one instance of the Barcan principles is enough to yield the 
same result, at least granted the apparently evident claim that it is necessary that 
everything exists.) 
10. The example here is rather unorthodox. However, I believe that it is 
orthodox to hold that God has no parts-so Koons' fourth corollary is already a 
departure from orthodoxy. Perhaps the example in the text could be evaded by 
placing limitations on the kinds of attributes for which it is true iliat attributes of 
ilie parts of God "correspond" to attributes of God. However, I iliink we need 
clarification before we can proceed to look for other kinds of counterexamples. 
11. Note, by the way, iliat it is no objection here to say that it is fairly uncon-
troversial to claim iliat it is logically impossible for God to be ugly, evil and stu-
pid (and hence that these attributions to God make no sense). Koons is in the 
middle of an attempt to establish that his First Cause-which I have followed 
him in calling "God" -does indeed have the attributes which traditional ilieolo-
gy attributes to God. Given what Koons has established so far, it seems plainly 
logically possible that his First Cause is ugly, evil and stupid. Moreover, it is part 
of Koons' project to show that his First Cause does not have these properties; it 
would be self-defeating for him simply to assume that it does not have these 
properties because God does not have them. 
12. J. Earman, Bangs, Crunches, Shrieks and Whispers (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995) p. 207. 
13. Note that I'm not saying that I agree with everything that Koons has to 
say, nor even that all twelve of these objections are mistaken. Some of them 
plainly are mistaken; some of them may just require more argument. 
14. For further discussion of these issues, see my "Hume and the Argument 
for Biological Design," Biology and Philosophy 11,1996, pp. 519-34. 
15. I would like to thank ilie Editor and three anonymous referees for helpful 
and encouraging comments which led to various kinds of improvements over 
the initial version of this paper. As usual, the remaining flaws are all my own 
fault. 
